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I. INTRODUCTION
This comment analyzes a case from the Polish Supreme Court that,
because of its rigorous discussion of many fundamental matters and
embodiment of the Court’s effort to make its decision within the framework
of the Vienna Convention, serves as a great contribution to the global CISG
jurisprudence.
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods (hereinafter called “CISG,” “the Convention” or “the Vienna
Convention”)  is a relatively new law in Poland. It went into effect on June 1,1
1996, and the first opinion of the Polish Supreme Court applying the
Convention was not issued until December of 2003.  At that time, the Court2
clearly struggled with the applicable principles embedded in the Convention
and failed to discuss some crucial issues emerging from the facts.  The Court’s3
avoidance of a thorough analysis of outstanding issues and its other
methodological weaknesses were not only in the area of the CISG; this
problem extended generally to many new legal rules.  Judges were often4
criticized for their formal application of written law and their resistance to fill
in legal gaps and develop new legal concepts by referring to general principles
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of law.  Since then, the Polish Supreme Court has altered its approach by5
utilizing interpretation methods regarding general clauses and rules. Its 2007
decision involving the CISG is the best proof of the tremendous progress that
has been made by Polish judges.
The Court’s approach in the case is in line with the world trade
community’s goal: to “maintain the Convention as a source of uniform
international sales rules . . . when it is being applied by courts, arbitral
tribunals and lawyers in . . . countries with diverse legal cultures.”  Having6
shown the legal community its skillful application of the Vienna Convention,
the Court took an immense step towards changing the stereotype of Polish
courts as lacking in analytical rigor.
In its 2007 decision, the Court faced the problem of constructing a
buyer’s right to withhold payment of the purchase price where a non-
conformity of the delivered goods amounted to a fundamental breach. Further
complicating matters, the buyer was at fault because he failed to inspect the
goods before they were converted into another product by a third party
subcontractor. As a result of this oversight and the inability to return the goods
in substantially the same condition, the buyer could have been deprived of
some remedies in accordance with Article 82(1). Ultimately, however, the
Court derived the right to suspend performance from Article 71, which
governs anticipatory breach, in conjunction with the principle of good faith
embodied in Article 7(1), which regulates relations between the parties.
II. THE CASE
A. Facts
In January 2000, a Polish seller (Spoldzielnia Pracy “A”) and a German
buyer (M.W.D. GmbH & Co. KG) entered into a sales contract for 4,400
square meters of a specific type of leather for the purpose of manufacturing
military shoes for the German army (Bundeswehr).  The leather was delivered7
directly to a shoe manufacturer in Germany, and the German buyer did not
inspect the goods upon their delivery. After the shoes were manufactured, the
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German Federal Bureau for Technical Defense and Supply noticed that the
goods did not conform to the specifications of the offer. On May 12, 2000, the
buyer notified the seller that the goods were non-conforming, asked for a
quality control certificate, and fixed an additional period of time—until
May 15, 2000—for the seller to deliver conforming goods. In the meantime,
the Bundeswehr returned all the shoes (37,130 pairs). The seller refused to
deliver substitute goods, and on December 17, 2002, the buyer sent the seller
a declaration of avoidance of the contract.  Consequently, the seller sued the8
buyer for payment of the purchase price.
B. The Court’s Reasoning
In its analysis, the Supreme Court assumed that the CISG distinguishes
between breach, including fundamental breach and non-conformity of the
goods, and noted that common law and civil law differ as to the treatment of
a breach of contract. The Court stated that there should not be a distinction
between failure to perform and other breaches of contract, and furthermore,
that delivery of non-conforming goods is a breach of contract. The Court
explained that the rule on non-conformity as a breach stems from Article 35
of the Convention, which describes what characteristics goods must possess
to comport with the contract and provides that failure to fulfill those
characteristics amounts to non-conformity. However, mere non-conformity
does not entitle the buyer to require delivery of substitute goods under Article
46(2) of the Convention because this remedy is available only when the lack
of conformity constitutes a fundamental breach of contract under Article 25.
The Court continued that CISG scholars agree that Article 25 is one of the
most difficult provisions to interpret because it includes numerous undefined
terms. At the same time, this article is one of the most important provisions
because the matter of a fundamental breach, judged on the circumstances of
the contract and the expectations of the parties, determines which remedies are
available, especially delivery of substitute goods and avoidance of contract
without the requirement to give additional time to perform. Having the
freedom to choose remedies, the buyer is, however, bound to the contract and
should not, acting in good faith and as a reasonable person, first request
delivery of substitute goods and then, not waiting for delivery, declare the
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contract avoided. In addition, the Court briefly discussed the notion of a
fundamental breach, computation of damages by an objective standard, and
the burden of proof.
Then, the Court turned into the principal issue, namely the buyer’s right
to withhold performance. It agreed with legal literature providing that when
a buyer promptly requests substitute goods, a seller cannot demand payment
before the goods are delivered. In the Court’s opinion, this view follows the
general principles of the Vienna Convention, including the right to require
actual performance and concurrent exchange of performance, payment against
delivery. The Court noted that the Convention does not require that the
delivered goods perfectly comply with the terms of the contract, but if the
seller commits a fundamental breach, he should deliver substitute goods.
Furthermore, until the substitute goods are delivered, the buyer is not obliged
to pay the price because the seller would otherwise receive performance even
though he has not performed under the contract.
The decision acknowledged that Article 46(2) does not indicate that a
request for substitute goods automatically allows a party to wait to pay the
price because this provision governs only the right of the buyer to request a
delivery of substitute goods. The right to suspend payment is also not directly
based on Article 71, regulating the right to suspend the performance of
obligations in the case of an anticipatory breach of contract whereby it
becomes apparent that the other party will not perform a substantial part of his
obligations. That is because a remedy is not available under Article 71 where
the goods have been delivered to the buyer. Clearly, in a situation where a
breach of contract becomes apparent after the goods are tendered and the risk
shifts, it is difficult to talk about an anticipatory breach of contract.
Summarizing its analysis of Article 71, the Court concluded that there
was no basis to directly apply this article because there was no anticipatory
breach of the contract in question. However, the Court agreed with the buyer
that the appellate court violated the Convention by not analyzing whether
Article 71 can be applied by analogy or whether it establishes a general rule
of the Convention fulfilling a gap and giving the aggrieved party a general
right to withhold performance in order to force another party to perform
promptly.
In the Court’s view, the construction of such a rule is not only possible,
but also supported by the rules of good faith and fair dealing. The Court
referred to Opinion No. 5 of the CISG Advisory Council,  which derived the9
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10. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court], 4 Ob 179/05k, Internationales Handelsrecht
(Austria) (Nov. 2005), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/051108a3.html.
11. CISG art. 80.
right to withhold the performance of obligations as a result of non-conformity
from Articles 71, 81(2), 85, 86(2). In addition, it reasoned that this view has
been shared by some contracting states’ courts. The Austrian Supreme Court,
in its opinion from November 8, 2005,  ruled on the issue of nonpayment for10
non-conforming goods and indicated the possibility of deriving a general right
of the buyer to withhold its performance under the payment against delivery
rule.
The Polish Supreme Court’s conclusion was that filling in the gaps of the
Convention is possible through analogy, here by analogy to Article 71,
because legal literature and case law allow it for the purpose of interpreting
the CISG.
The Court also disagreed with the seller that Article 80 was violated.
Article 80 states that “[a] party may not rely on a failure of the other party to
perform, to the extent that such a failure was caused by the first party’s act or
omission.”  Accordingly, the Court reasoned that Article 80 imposes on the11
parties a duty of loyalty and abstention from any acts that would hinder the
performance of the contract. One of the imperative elements of this article is
the presence of legal causation linking the obligor’s conduct and obligee’s
performance. Under the circumstances, the buyer’s failure to pay the price was
not a result of lack of mutual performance under the contract, but rather a
result of the seller’s failure to tender goods conforming with the terms of the
contract.
The Court remanded the case and instructed the appellate court to analyze
the dispute in light of the good faith rule. It also acknowledged that the buyer
did not inspect the goods after they have been delivered and purchased
substitute goods without avoiding the contract. The seller, however, did not
show a willingness to work with the buyer to limit the consequences of non-
conformity. The fact that the seller relied only on its own judgment of the
quality of the goods and refused to cooperate with the buyer caused the buyer
to make a cover purchase. According to the Court, these circumstances may
lead to the rule of good faith which does not allow the obligee to receive what
he should give to his debtor as compensation for the harm caused.
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III. CASE ANALYSIS
A. Interpretation of the Convention Within Its Four Corners and the Good
Faith Rule—General Remarks
Because the Vienna Convention is the product of numerous compromises
between the representatives of different legal systems, it contains ambiguous
provisions and undefined terms which require appropriate interpretation.  For12
many conventions, uniform interpretation and application is often an
unachievable ideal because the difficulties of linguistic translation are
intertwined with those of different legal traditions, cultures, and practices.13
To diminish the inevitable discrepancies in the application of the CISG,
Article 7(1) obligates all contracting states to interpret the Convention in light
of its international character, with a view to maintaining uniformity in its
application and observance of good faith in international trade.  This14
autonomous method of interpretation is called a “four-corners approach” and
is constantly being developed with the aid of practices and “case law”
rendered by courts and arbitral tribunals of sister signatories.  The growing15
body of case law applying the CISG and referencing the jurisprudence
developed by other courts is key to the process of uniform interpretation of the
CISG, even though the opinions of other applying authorities, often from other
countries, are neither binding nor precedential in the common law sense.16
Another source of uniform interpretation and application is scholarly writings,
commentaries and opinions of the CISG Advisory Council. As much as civil
law judges often rely on these sources of interpretation, they are new and
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23. CISG art. 7(1).
rarely referred to in common law countries.  However, in recent years, a more17
relaxed and liberal approach to the use of doctrine has been noticed in
common law systems.18
1. Gap-Filling by Analogy
Article 7(2) of the Convention instructs that “questions concerning
matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled in it”
should in the first instance be resolved “in conformity with the general
principles on which it is based.”  This provision indicates that the CISG19
presupposes gaps in the Convention which courts and tribunals should fill
within the Convention’s “four corners.”  Yet, it is worthy of remark that20
Article 7(2) does not require that all gaps be filled autonomously. Rather, if
a particular gap cannot be filled by recourse to the general principles
underlying the Convention, “the traditional method of determining the law
applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law applies.”21
Commentators agree that, even though analogy to certain provisions of the
Convention is not mentioned as a means of resolving matters not settled in the
CISG, it is a permissible method of interpretation and gap-filing.  This view22
has been followed by the Polish Supreme Court, which demonstrated
unprecedented discipline in applying Article 7(1) of the Convention and cited
with approval a case from Austria and a CISG Advisory Opinion allowing
such a method of gap-filling.
2. Good Faith
As mentioned before, Article 7(1) requires that the CISG be interpreted
uniformly to promote its international character and forbids recourse to
domestic principles.  In addition, Article 7(1) points to the broad application23
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of good faith in international trade.  Thus, good faith as a principle is not only24
applied to the interpretation of the CISG as a whole, but it also governs the
behavior of the contracting parties.25
The concept of good faith was introduced to the Polish legal system in
1990 and indirectly stems from Article 7 of the Civil Code,  which states that26
if certain legal consequences are viewed in light of good or bad faith, good
faith is presumed.  In its decision, the Court adequately grasped the dual27
nature of the good faith principle of the CISG. It appears that good faith was
the leading theme in analyzing the Convention’s language, filling in its
internal gaps, and judging the conduct of the parties. The Court invoked the
good faith principle to determine the buyer’s rights within the Convention’s
framework. Specifically, the Court considered whether the parties acted in
good faith by acknowledging that, indeed, the buyer failed to inspect the
goods, but the seller showed no willingness to mitigate the buyer’s losses and
stubbornly claimed that the leather was of the ordered quality when in fact it
was not.
B. Buyer’s Rights and Remedies for Breach of Contract by the Seller
Under the Convention, the seller is obliged to, inter alia, deliver the
goods  and to do so in compliance with the contract.  Any breach of the28 29
seller’s duty equals a failure to perform and triggers the remedies listed in
Article 45(1).30
The CISG equips the buyer with different kinds of remedies which are
available depending on the “severity” of the seller’s breach. For example,
“avoidance of the sales contract is restricted to cases in which a fundamental
breach occurs, and to cases where the seller has not properly performed after
the buyer granted a Nachfrist period.”31
When the seller’s breach of contract is due to a lack of conformity of
goods, Article 46 gives “the buyer [a] choice between two closely linked
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remedies: he can require for delivery of substitute goods, or he can require the
seller for repair of the lack of conformity.”  However, it is worthy of remark32
that Article 46(2) gives the buyer the right to require delivery of substitute
goods if the breach is fundamental and the request is made within a reasonable
period of time.33
Finally, if the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may
reduce the price in proportion to the diminished value of the delivered goods.34
The Convention, however, does not explicitly address the right to withhold
payment of purchase price in case of breach of contract.
1. Buyer’s Right to Withhold Payment of Price
Article 45 does not exhaustively govern the rights of the buyer; additional
remedies can be derived by analogy to other provisions of the Convention. It
is true that the CISG does not contain an explicit provision generally allowing
one party to withhold its performance in case of the other party’s breach of
contract. By the same token, the buyer’s right to withhold performance,
including payment of the purchase price, is not excluded by the provisions
governing the buyer’s rights and remedies, and therefore, the majority of
writers are of the opinion that such a right may be derived by analogy to
Article 7(2).  Hence, courts can construct a right of the buyer to withhold35
payment of the price when the performance rendered is not in conformity with
the contract.
Some authors infer the buyer’s general right to suspend performance upon
receipt of non-conforming goods from the principle of “payment against
delivery” expounded in Article 58, which mandates the payment of the price
only when the goods delivered to the buyer conform with the contract.  The36
reasoning behind this view is that this interpretation is compatible with the
buyer’s right to inspect the goods, which would otherwise have no meaning.37
Thus, if the goods delivered are not in conformity with the contract and the
buyer, in accordance with Articles 46(2) and (3), requires a substitute delivery
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or repairs, the buyer may withhold payment in reliance on the fact that
payment is not yet due.38
The buyer’s right to withhold performance may also be derived from the
principles underlying Articles 71, 81(2), 85, and 86(1).  This view has been39
widely accepted by civil law academics.  On the other hand, another view,40
expressed by Schnyder and Straub, is that the Convention does not contain any
general right for one party to withhold its performance, and if the contract is
breached, the innocent party may only seek remedies contained in the
Convention.  This view is said to stem from Article 48, which entitles the41
seller to remedy the non-conformity of his performance and explicitly reserves
for the buyer only claims for avoidance and damages, but is silent with regard
to the right to refuse performance.42
Finally, the right to withhold payment may be derived from the
UNIDROIT Principles,  which are often used to supplement the gaps of the43
Convention.  This approach has been adopted in 1999 by the Arbitration44
Court of the International Chamber of Commerce when ruling on a case
involving a dispute between a Bulgarian seller and a Greek buyer.  In that45
case, the buyer suspended payment alleging non-conformity of a subsequent
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shipment after several thousand tons of conforming goods had been
delivered.  The Court agreed with the buyer that it could suspend payment46
until the parties agree on the nature of the alleged non-conformity on the basis
of Article 7.1.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles because the ULIS, like the
current CISG, contained no general rule allowing a party to suspend
performance.47
2. Polish Court’s Construction of the Buyer’s Right to Withhold Payment
In this 2007 opinion, the Polish Supreme Court stated that the right to
suspend payment cannot be inferred from Article 46(2) because it governs the
buyer’s right to request delivery of substitute goods if the delivered goods do
not conform with the terms of the contract. Similarly, the general right to
suspend performance could not be directly derived from Article 71 because
it regulates an anticipatory breach of contract. However, the Court held that
Article 71 serves as a basis for deriving, by analogy, the right to suspend
payment. In order to justify this analogy, the Court stated that such practice
is acceptable and compatible with the good faith principle as it promotes
uniformity and “uncovers” general principles underlying the Convention. This
view is in line with that of a leading CISG expert, who opined that such a
general right can be developed from a principle embodied in Article 71.48
What is unique about this decision is that the Court did not rely on Article
58, which is the strongest basis to infer the general right to suspend
performance and directly touches on the issue of payment of the purchase
price. This may be explained, however, by the facts of the case, which clearly
did not fall under the rule embodied in Article 58(3) which allows the buyer
to withhold the payment of the purchase price until he has had an opportunity
to examine the goods. As the facts in this case indicate, the buyer and its
subcontractor had such an opportunity but failed to inspect the goods after
they were delivered. This major failure on part of the buyer was nevertheless
excused in accordance with the good faith principle because the seller’s fault
was greater than the buyer’s in that he showed no willingness to remedy the
non-conformity and accordingly mitigate damages. Thus, under the
circumstances, the Court had to show more creativity in finding a solution that
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would protect the aggrieved buyer and prevent the stubborn seller from
receiving more than he should have gotten under the contract.
The final outcome is correct even though, at the first glance, one may feel
sympathetic to the seller who delivered the ordered leather, which was
accepted without inspection and converted into military shoes before non-
conformity was discovered. Yet in the end, the seller was left with over 30,000
shoes which could not be easily resold and did not get payment from the
buyer. It is true that the restitution issue could have arisen in the case, but that
question was not before the Supreme Court which had to address the question
of whether the seller was really entitled to the payment of the purchase price
after having committed a fundamental breach and shown no willingness to
cooperate.
Overall, the Polish Supreme Court properly held that the buyer, who
demanded substitute delivery under Article 46, also had the right to withhold
the payment of the price until such time as the seller performed its obligations
in conformity with the contract.
IV. CONCLUSION
This case demonstrates that the Polish Supreme Court closely observed
the mandate of Article 7(1) to deliver a uniform, “international” interpretation
of the Convention. Moreover, the Court’s lengthy remarks on such concepts
as fundamental breach, avoidance of a contract and seller’s remedies in
general have indispensable value to subordinate national courts which often
have no means to reach to and use opinions in foreign languages. By
undertaking an extensive analysis, the Court gives guidance to lower courts
and promotes uniformity at the national level which will later result in better
predictability of outcomes on a global scale. The approach taken by the Court
shows tremendous progress in building useful international jurisprudence
since its first decision in 2003, where the Court abstained from discussing
several issues that were at the heart of the case. Hopefully, the Court will
maintain its interpretational skills and will inspire lower courts to apply the
CISG with the same rigor so that, in the near future, CISG jurisprudence from
Poland will serve as a reliable source for other courts and arbitration tribunals
around the globe.
